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I.   ERP HISTORY AND EVOLUTION 
A. INTRODUCTION TO ENTERPRISE RESOURCE PLANNING SYSTEMS 
An Enterprise Resource Planning System (ERP) is a software program that 
integrates the operations and functions of a business into a single computer system that 
serves all departments (Koch).  Without ERP, the typical business will have stand-alone 
computer systems for finance, inventory management, personnel management, etc.  Each 
system is tailored to the specific operations, tasks, and data collection requirements of the 
department it serves.  While this configuration might suit the department’s needs, it can 
be difficult, particularly in large corporations and government agencies, to integrate the 
data between departments.  Combining the departmental data to provide corporate-level 
analysis and reporting is difficult and time consuming.  Perhaps the greatest inefficiency 
in this type of configuration is the duplication of efforts, data storage, and unmatched 
databases.  The purpose of the Enterprise Resource Planning system is to integrate all 
organizational functions into a single, integrated system with a single database (Koch). 
For example, an order originating in the sales module could generate an order to 
distribution, update the financial module, and provide updated statistics for the corporate 
planning module.  An ERP system can perform these functions quickly, automatically, 
and with fewer errors than if performed manually (“Enterprise Resource Planning”). 
ERP software packages typically provide modules for customer-relationship 
management, sales and marketing, distribution, financials, and corporate planning (“ERP 
Software Guide”).  Although the names might change for different vendors, most module 
functions fit in these categories.  What sets the ERP system apart from its predecessors is 
the integration between the modules. In addition to the core function modules, many ERP 
providers and third-party vendors have developed add-on modules and integration 




B.   THE EVOLUTION OF ERP SYSTEMS 
The roots of ERP systems can be traced to the movement toward automation and 
computer-based inventory management programs in the 1960’s.  As computer use 
became more prominent and affordable, software programs were developed for inventory 
management control (Kampf).  The focus of these early systems was to identify inventory 
requirements, set inventory targets, provide replenishment techniques and options, 
monitor item usage, reconcile inventory balances, and report inventory status to managers 
(“History of ERP Systems”).   
In the 1970’s, the focus of software application development was Material 
Requirements Planning (MRP).  MRP systems provided a means of translating the master 
production schedule into requirements for individual sub-assemblies and raw material 
planning and procurement (Kampf).  Schedules could be generated for operations and 
raw material purchases based on the requirements for finished goods, the production 
system structure, current inventory, and lot sizing procedures (“History of ERP 
Systems”). 
Material Requirements Planning II (MRP-II) evolved in the 1980’s as a system 
for optimizing the entire plant’s operations.  In its earlier incarnations, MRP-II added the 
capabilities of shop-floor management and distribution management activities.  Later 
versions included the ability to manage finances, human resources, engineering, and 
project management.  Enterprise Resource Planning systems were then developed as an 
integrated system that coordinated operations and data between modules to support 
production (Kampf). 
 
C.   ERP IN THE BUSINESS ENVIRONMENT  
The focus of most modern ERP systems is to improve the order fulfillment 
process.  Its purpose is to streamline the internal processes that turn an order into revenue 
with maximum efficiency.  Modern ERP systems replace stand-alone departmental 
systems with an integrated software program.  Most companies undertake an ERP to 
improve efficiency in three core areas: manufacturing, financials, and human resources 
(Kampf).  The manufacturing modules standardize processes across business units and 
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departments, eliminating redundancy in processes, personnel, and computer systems.  
ERP financial modules provide a single version of financial data across business units 
and departments.  The typical human resources module provides a single database for 
tracking employee pay, benefits, and services.  Add-on modules have also been 
developed for supply-chain management, product lifecycle management, customer 
relationships, inventory management, and many other business and administrative 
functions (“Enterprise Resource Planning”). 
A successfully implemented ERP system can offer several advantages to a 
corporation.  The following list summarizes the most common advantages of a successful 
ERP system: 
• Inventory Reduction- this is largely due to a reduction in the amount of raw 
material and work-in-progress inventory.  Additional benefits are gained from 
better-planned deliveries to customers and reduced inventory at warehouses and 
shipping docks.  
• Improved and Integrated Customer Service- Instead of a customer order being 
handed off from department to department, it is instantly communicated 
throughout the company.  Order information is instantly available to all 
departments that require it.  For example, a shipping department would receive 
notification of an order as soon as it was taken, allowing them to plan for its 
arrival and departure long before they receive it (Koch). 
• Standardized Manufacturing Process- multiple business units often use different 
systems and methods for manufacturing.  ERP systems standardize a 
manufacturing method across department lines, increasing productivity and 
possibly reducing manpower.  Redundant processes and computer systems are 
eliminated as well (Koch, Kampf). 
• Integrated Financial Information- Every department’s revenues and costs are 
held in a single database.  A corporate-level picture of the financial well-being 
of the company is available much quicker than a system where department 
finances are kept separate.  Invoice and order management tools can reduce the 
payment cycle (Koch).      
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Unfortunately, not all ERP implementations have been viewed as a success.  
Many companies have reverted to their old systems after finding their ERP system didn’t 
fit their needs.  Many other companies have pulled the plug on a conversion before it was 
ever completed.  There are several reasons why ERP systems fail, but the following 
reasons dominate any discussion of ERP failures: 
• ERP systems change your business processes.  The conversion affects more than 
the computer and information systems.  Companies must change their processes 
and work-methods to match the software.  Despite this information being readily 
available, this is the most common reason that companies walk away from an 
ERP conversion.  When a company discovers that one of their processes is not 
supported by the software, they have two options.  The first option is to change 
their processes and practices in accordance with the software.  In some cases, 
the business process in question is a vital competitive advantage of the 
company.  Management will be hesitant to change a process or practice that is 
critical to the success of the corporation.  Even when the decision is made to 
change the process, the conversion is seldom easy.  Most people naturally resist 
change.  Employees must be trained and new roles and processes defined.  A 
working process must be discarded and a new process implemented.  Companies 
resistant to change are more likely to fail than a company that embraces change 
(Koch).  If the company decides to change the software to meet the business 
practice, the process becomes even more complicated.  The changes will 
increase the cost of the system and slow down the project.  Due to the integrated 
nature of an ERP system, changes have a ripple effect down to other modules in 
the system.  Changes are seldom easy to implement.  Each time the vendor 
updates the software, the company will have to pay to have the changes 
rewritten into the new release.  This becomes increasingly difficult with each 
update (“Enterprise Resource Planning”).  Inadequate requirements definition 
leads to a poor ERP package selection.  The determination of whether the 
business process will meet the software functionality should be made before the 
company decides to implement an ERP system.  A company considering an ERP 
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system must have adequately documented the business processes and functions 
involved in the conversion.  The processes and functions must be matched to a 
system that can adequately replace them.  Without adequate requirements 
definition, a company is left with an ERP system that doesn’t provide the 
required functionality.  The solutions to this problem are more money for 
additional changes or continuing to operate the system (in a stand-alone 
configuration) the company just paid to replace (Koch).    
• Like most information technology projects, ERP conversions are prone to cost 
overruns.  In 2003, the average cost overrun for an IT project was 43 percent 
(“Project Cost Management”).  Companies must adequately address and plan for 
the expenses involved.  Failures in the planning and requirements definition 
phase lead to unforeseen costs in the implementation phase (“Why ERP fails”).  
The aforementioned scenario where a company decides to change the software 
vice the process is an example of a cost that usually doesn’t become apparent 
until the implementation phase.  This customization makes the system unstable 
and harder to maintain once it is being implemented, which leads to higher 
costs.  Eventually the increases in cost force some companies to abandon the 
project entirely (Koch).  
• Time delays in the conversion process can be financially devastating.  
Unrealistic time-frame estimations lead to an underestimation of the loss of 
revenue while a company is undergoing the conversion (“Why ERP fails”).  
Delays caused by debugging, testing, and training led to lost orders, customers, 
and revenue for contractor GTSI in 2005.  The company converted to an ERP 
system in 2005 in an effort to double revenue by 2007.  Instead, the company 
blamed a disappointing second quarter of 2005 on the delays caused by the ERP 
conversion. The company says its ability to meet its long-term financial goals is 
also in jeopardy.  In 1999, Hershey was unable to ship orders in the weeks 
before the lucrative Halloween season due to delays in their ERP project 
(Moore).   
 6
• Inadequate education and training cause delays in the conversion and return to 
normal business operations.  The changes in roles and responsibilities after an 
ERP conversion are usually extensive.  Personnel not adequately trained and 
prepared for a new role do not embrace the change (“Why ERP fails”). 
The costs of an ERP system vary depending on the package, but they are always 
substantial.  The Meta Group conducted a study to determine the Total Cost of 
Ownership (TCO) of ERP.  The study included hardware, software, professional services, 
and staff costs.  TCO figures include the cost of installation and the first two years of 
operation.  The sixty-three companies surveyed varied in size from small to large and 
covered a variety of industries.  The average TCO was fifteen million dollars.  The 
highest figure was $300 million and the lowest $400,000.  A more accurate indicator of 
the cost of an ERP system is the cost per “heads-down” user.  The Meta Group study 
produced an implementation cost of $53,320 per user (“Enterprise Resource Planning”). 
The total cost of an ERP implementation is not easy to determine.  In addition to 
costs of the software and installation, there are several costs that are often overlooked: 
• Training-Employees must be trained on the new software interface.  The vendor 
can usually provide training on how to operate the interface, but not how that 
fits the way the company does business.  Additional training might be required 
to explain the new business processes to be implemented (Koch). 
• Integration and Testing-Once the system is installed, it must be tested to 
determine if it is successfully integrated with the rest of the corporate system.  If 
the business operates its own e-commerce or supply-chain system, it must be 
successfully linked to the ERP system.  Some ERP vendors will sell the add-ons 
and integration, or the company can do it themselves.  Either way, it will require 
additional funding (Koch). 
• Customization-The downfalls of customization have already been discussed in 
great detail.  The costs of customization will continue each time the software is 
upgraded.  Additionally, the vendor might not always be there to continue to 
modify the system.  The costs to hire a third party to perform the modifications 
and maintain them will be significant (Koch). 
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• Data Conversion-Existing systems and data must be changed to fit the ERP 
system.  All pertinent data must be moved from the old systems to the ERP.  If 
the format isn’t compatible, it will need to be changed, or the data cannot be 
used (Koch). 
The length of time for an ERP project is dependent on the size of the company 
and the complexity of the system to be installed.  It is important to consider items such as 
training, testing, and process re-engineering when estimating the time a conversion will 
take.  In smaller companies or limited conversions, the timeframe could be as short as six 
months.  For most large companies, the timeframe for a conversion is measured in years 
(Koch).   
The methods for implementation are also dependent on the type of package and 
business involved.  The approaches can be summarized into three broad categories 
(Kampf): 
• Big Bang-The company completely abandons its legacy systems and 
implements an ERP system across the entire company.  This approach is the 
most ambitious and difficult of the three approaches. 
• Franchising-In this approach, an ERP system is installed in an independent 
division or business unit.  The system links common processes and data across 
the corporation.  This approach is more common among large companies with 
several business units. 
• Slam-Dunk-The ERP system dictates the process designs.  The company 
conforms to the ERP systems processes.  The goal is to get the system online as 
soon as possible.  This approach is for smaller companies who can grow into the 
ERP.   
 
D.   ERP KEYS TO SUCCESS 
The early days of ERP implementation had its share of failures.  As the 
technology matured, several widely-accepted keys to successful implementation have 
been developed as the number of implementations (successful and unsuccessful) 
increased. 
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A business process review should be undertaken to match processes and software.  
This will ensure the company has selected a software package that will support its 
operations.  This will also identify the areas where the company must make changes in 
their processes to match the ERP system. 
Education and training is critical.  Training should focus on change management 
strategies and what the new business process will look like.  Employees should 
understand what new system is designed to accomplish.  The department managers and 
end-users must be trained in how to use the system. 
Software modifications must be limited to critical functions that are vital to the 
company. Changes should be made to the process vice the software if possible.  
Modifications to the software will increase the cost, timeframe, and complexity of the 
conversion. The cost increases will be recurring since the changes will need to be re-
installed with each update of the software (“Why ERP fails”). 
A change management team can be the difference between success and failure.  
When a company commits to an ERP project, they are committing to more than just a 
software change.  They are changing the business.  Change management teams train 
employees, evaluate and implement new processes, and provide support to the users of 
the new system.  The team should focus on real changes to the business vice monetary 
savings (“ERP Implementations and ROI…”). 
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II.   THE MOTIVATION TO ADOPT ERP 
A.        DOD FINANCIAL MANAGEMENT REFORMS 
The past three decades have produced a renewed focus on the government’s 
financial management practices.  The Department of Defense in particular has been 
pushed toward adopting best practices and standards from corporate America.  A series of 
Congressional Acts and initiatives starting in the 1980’s provided the impetus for 
sweeping changes to government financial management. 
• Federal Managers Financial Integrity Act (1982)-This act requires executive 
agencies to evaluate and report the adequacy of its internal accounting systems 
and administrative controls, as well as any weakness that could lead to waste, 
fraud, and abuse.  The prevalence of wasteful spending, ineffective programs, 
and billions of dollars in lost funds in the early 1980’s resulted in the 
establishment of the President’s Improvement Program.  Thousands of 
antiquated, redundant systems in the government were unable to produce basic 
government-wide management reports to the President.  The weaknesses in the 
information systems made fraud easier to commit and the archaic, inaccurate 
accounting systems made it difficult to catch.  The Federal Managers Financial 
Integrity Act was part of the President’s attempts to modernize federal financial 
management (Jones 340-341). 
• Chief Financial Officer’s Act (1990)-The CFO act created the position of CFO 
for the United States in the Office of Management and Budget and twenty-two 
other CFO’s in major agencies.  The position was intended to provide oversight 
and direction for federal financial management and information systems, 
including productivity measures, asset management, cash management, and 
internal controls.  Among the many requirements for the newly established 
Chief Financial Officers would be providing annual financial statements using 
generally accepted accounting terms.  These statements would audited annually 
and certified by the Inspector General.  Other provisions included a reduction in 
the number of separate department accounting systems and continuing the 
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modernization of financial systems.  Much of the framework for financial 
management reform had been created prior to the CFO act, but the passage of 
this statute provided continuity to the reform efforts (Jones 350). 
• Government Performance and Results Act (1993)-Directs federal agencies to 
prepare strategic plans based on performance.  Congress requires annual reports 
comparing actual performance to goals.  This act provided Congress a link 
between program spending and expected program results (“Overview of 
GPRA”).   
• Government Management Reform Act (1994)-The GMRA expanded the Chief 
Financial Officer Act, requiring the 24 agencies that account for 99 percent of 
federal spending to prepare annual audited financial statements.  The statements 
should present a picture of the financial position of each entity, including assets 
and liabilities and the results of operations (“Legislation and Reform 
Initiatives”).   
• Corporate Information Management (CIM) Program-This program was 
established in 1989 with the goal of streamlining operations and implementing 
standard information systems to support common business operations.  CIM was 
expected to consolidate, standardize, and integrate information systems in all of 
DOD’s functional areas-finance, procurement, material management, and human 
resources.  This program was criticized by Congress as lacking sound analytical 
justification in its investments and decision-making.  The program was 
abandoned after eight years and twenty billion dollars with little to show for the 
effort (Kutz 4). 
 
B. DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE PROGRESS IN COMPLYING WITH 
FINANCIAL MANAGEMENT REFORM ISSUES 
The Department of Defense has had great difficulty complying with many of the 
reform issues.  DOD has not received one clean audit of the required financial statements.  
Despite significant effort and billions of dollars in funding, many of the conditions that 
led to the attempts at reform remain largely unchanged today (Kutz 3). 
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Congress identified four underlying causes for the department’s difficulties in 
implementing reform: 
• A lack of top-level leadership and management accountability for correcting 
problems. 
• A deep cultural resistance to change, including parochialism and stovepiped 
operations. 
• The department lack results-oriented goals and performance measures. 
• There are inadequate incentives for change. 
Additionally, the department has not historically assigned accountability for 
performance to organizations or individuals who have sufficient authority to accomplish 
the desired goals.  For example, the DOD comptroller has responsibility for only 20 
percent of the data relied on the carry out the department’s financial management 
operations (Kutz 10). 
The department’s financial management problems go beyond its accounting and 
finance systems and processes.  There are critical hardware and software deficiencies that 
contribute to the problem.  The department relies on a complex, non-integrated network 
of finance, logistics, personnel, acquisition, and management information systems to 
gather the financial data to support management decision-making.  Much of this network 
(80 percent) is not under the control of the DOD comptroller.  The network was not 
designed, it grew piecemeal and independently into the complex system that exists today.  
Its biggest flaws include (1) lack of standardization across DOD components, (2) 
multiple systems performing the same tasks, (3) redundant data stored in multiple 
systems, (4) manual data entry into multiple systems, and (5) many data translations and 
interfaces that combine to intensify data integrity problems (Kutz 6). 
The challenges of financial management reforms have the attention of Congress 
and the Secretary of Defense.  The department remains focused on developing and 
implementing an architecture to achieve integrated financial and accounting systems that 
are relevant, timely, and reliable.  Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld stated in his 
2001 Quadrennial Defense Review that the department must transform its outdated 
support structure and decades-old financial systems.  He summarized the challenges in 
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stating: “While America’s businesses have streamline and adopted new business models 
to react to fast-moving changes in markets and technologies, the Defense Department has 
lagged behind without an overarching strategy to improve its business practices (Kutz 15-
16).” 
 
C. THE REVOLUTION IN BUSINESS AFFAIRS (RBA) AND NAVY ERP 
 The revolution in business affairs (RBA) program was developed in 1997 as a 
result of the Secretary of the Navy’s desire to implement Joint Vision 2010 and to 
strategically transform business affairs within the Navy.  Joint Vision 2010, sponsored by 
the Joint Chiefs of Staff, created a vision for revolutionizing and modernizing the 
business processes in the military.  The Navy and DOD were still struggling to conform 
to the management reform initiatives of the previous two decades.  Congressional 
criticism of the services efforts at implementing reform often focused on a lack of 
leadership and management from the highest levels of the services.  The RBA program 
was the Navy’s attempt to put in place the infrastructure to transform the Navy’s business 
and financial operations.  
 An RBA Board of Directors was developed consisting of the Under Secretary of 
the Navy, the Vice Chief of Naval Operations and the Assistant Commandant of the 
Marine Corps.  They directed an Executive Committee (RBAEXCOM) be established, 
whose mission was to identify ways of transforming the Navy’s business operations and 
identify areas with opportunity for change (Berg).  The executive committee developed 
various working groups aimed towards transformation.  The Commercial Financial 
Practices (CFP) Working Group was directed to lead the way in developing better 
business practices for financial management decisions within the Navy. 
The CFP was led by VADM Lockard, Commander, Naval Air Systems Command 
(COMNAVAIR), and was composed of various financial managers throughout the Navy.  
Their assigned mission included (Berg): 
• Consolidate and prioritize current financial management initiatives and progress 
to serve as the foundation for future reform. 
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• Accelerate the Department-wide introduction and use of appropriate commercial 
financial practices and reporting. 
• Develop a strategic plan for implanting a business management process that will 
enable DON decision-makers to assess cost and performance. 
• Establish a plan and architecture to implement reforms.   
Their ultimate conclusion was to have six pilot programs implement ERP with 
differing functionalities.  The selection was made because old legacy systems still in use 
today are expensive to maintain, and the group hoped that ERP systems would cut costs 
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III.   THE NAVY ERP PILOTS 
A.        INTRODUCTION    
The Commercial Financial Practices Working Group was renamed the 
Commercial Business Practices Working Group (CBP) , and it was this group, still led by 
VADM Lockard, that ultimately decided the Navy should venture into Enterprise 
Resource Planning (ERP).   
Following several meetings and several presentations by various vendors 
including Oracle, Price Waterhouse Coopers and organizations within the Navy, a 
decision to go forward was made.   “Industry executives told Navy leaders that their 
success in re-engineering business processes came from their ERP systems, which helped 
them integrate and coordinate all aspects of their operations (McCarter).”  The working 
group identified as its vision:  “DON will use best business practices and supporting 
architecture to make informed decisions resulting in optimal outcomes (Berg 13).”  They 
also came up with the following goals (Berg 13): 
• Achieve integrity in the DON financial condition – maintain public trust. 
• Get the right business information to the right people at the right time – one set 
of books. 
• Know cost drivers and relate costs to value. 
• Make financial info an automatic by-product of process/decision. 
• Develop decision support capabilities for all levels. 
• Identify and install required architecture (Develop architecture to support end to 
end capability).  
Ultimately, these goals were the driving forces leading them to ERP.  To get the 
ERP program moving, six pilot programs with differing functionalities were identified 
(Berg 13): 
• Naval Air Systems (NAVAIR) - Program Management/Acquisition. 
• Naval Supply Systems Command (NAVSUP) partnered with (NAVAIR) - 
Aviation Supply Chain Management and Maintenance. 
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• Space and Naval Warfare Systems Command (SPAWAR) - Financial 
Management. 
• Naval Sea Systems Command (NAVSEA) – Regional Maintenance. 
• Commander in Chief Pacific Fleet (CINCPACFLT) – Facilities Management. 
• U.S. Marine Corps (USMC) – Logistics.   
The first four programs listed above passed initial decision points and survived 
any budget constraints enough to continue.  “Navy officials originally identified six pilots 
but could fund only four this year, said Ronald Turner, the service’s deputy chief 
information officer for infrastructure, systems and technology (Murray).”   
CINCPACFLT and USMC will be integrated into the Navy ERP as the program 
develops.  Figure 3-1 shows the scope of the individual four pilots, the pilot name, area of 
focus and stand-up date.   
 
Figure 3-1. NAVY ERP PILOT PROGRAMS (Bogdanowicz) 
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B.        INTRODUCTION TO THE FOUR PILOT PROGRAMS 
The four pilot programs were each given the go ahead in 1999, and interestingly, 
the four Program Managers (PM’s) were given the authority to choose different 
integrating contractors and ERP software.  The Executive Steering Group thought the 
best way to figure out which ERP software was superior was to let each pilot select one 
on their own and see which one had a better solution once the programs got initiated 
(McCarter).  Fortunately, considering the integration challenges ahead, all four programs 
selected SAP software.  “SAP is a market and technology leader in client/server 
enterprise application software, providing comprehensive solutions for companies of all 
sizes and all industry (“SAP Global”).”  Figure 3-2 is the SAP database configured for 
the NEMAIS pilot as of January 2005.  Each pilot started with the basic database as 
shown and developed from there.  The four did, however, select different integrating 
contractors to implement the software. 
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1.         Naval Air Systems Command (NAVAIR): SIGMA 
NAVAIR is the lead agency for the Program Management ERP pilot SIGMA.  
They are also the co-lead on project SMART.  The command has 10 locations around the 
world including one in Atsugi, Japan, one in Naples, Italy and 8 others within the United 
States.  Their current vision statement says, “We exist to provide cost-wise readiness and 
dominant maritime combat power to make a great Navy/Marine Corps team better.”  
Their goals are as follows (“About NAVAIR”): 
• To balance current and future readiness.  We need to ensure that we provide our 
Naval Aviators with the right products to fight the Global War On Terrorism 
and other potential future conflicts. 
• To reduce our costs of doing business.  We need to pursue actual cost 
reductions, not so-called 'savings' or 'avoidance.' We need to return resources to 
recapitalize our Fleet for tomorrow. We must continue to introduce best business 
practices and remove barriers to getting our job done with greater efficiencies. 
• To improve agility.  Our ability to make rapid decisions in support of emerging 
Fleet requirements is essential if we are to continue to provide value to the 
nation. We must reinvigorate a solid chain of command that values 
responsibility and accountability in its leadership. 
• To ensure alignment.   We have come a long way aligning ourselves internally, 
now it is time to ensure that we are fully aligned, internally and externally, with 
CNO's transformation initiatives. 
• To implement Fleet-driven metrics.  Single Fleet-driven metrics will ensure we 
directly contribute to the Naval Aviation Enterprise. 
• SIGMA officially began in February 2000 with a five year contract awarded to 
KPMG, a business consulting firm and the leading integrator for the project, 
with subcontractors IBM and SAIC assisting with implementation and 
installation of proven Commercial-Off-The-Shelf (COTS) SAP ERP software 
with minimal changes (Dyer 2).  In a brief given in 2001, VADM Dyer, 
Commander of the Naval Air Systems Command (“About NAVAIR”), stated 
that SIGMA’s intention was to demonstrate program management capability 
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using data and processes from the E-2C Hawkeye program office, and SIGMA’s 
primary impact on NAVAIR was expected to impact NAVAIR Headquarters, 
North Island, Patuxent River and Orlando locations (Dyer 2). The main focus 
areas of the project include: 
• Financial Management. 
• Weapon System Acquisition. 
• Asset Tracking / Configuration Management. 
• Human Resources. 
2.   Space and Naval Warfare Systems Command (SPAWAR):       
CABRILLO 
SPAWAR is the lead agency for the Navy Working Capital Fund (NWFC) project 
CABRILLO.  The command has four major fleet activities, and CABRILLO is specific to 
the NWCF in San Diego.  SPAWAR’s current vision statement reads “FORCEnet is the 
decisive weapon for the future Force,” and their mission statement reads “Team 
SPAWAR “delivers” FORCEnet – transforming information into decisive effects.”  On 
the company website, SPAWAR provides six major items which cover the spectrum of 
services they provide as follows (“Space and Naval…”): 
• Partner with PEO C4I and Space, PEO Space Systems and PEO Enterprise 
Information Systems to deliver C4ISR and FORCEnet capability to the joint 
warfighter. 
• Develop Navy, joint and coalition interoperability. 
• Serve as Navy C4ISR Chief Engineer. 
• Serve as Navy FORCEnet Chief Architect/Assessor. 
• Maintain combined TOA of $5.4 Billion. 
• SPAWAR is one of the Navy’s five major acquisition commands and has 7,600 
employees. 
CABRILLO began in June 2000, following a business case analysis completed in 
1999, and was to focus on improving the business operations, process and support 
systems in San Diego (Dyer 3).  The primary integrating contractor selected was 
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PriceWaterhouseCoopers, and the selected software was from SAP.  The focus areas to 
be included in the pilot were (Frye 2): 
• Financial Management. 
• Procurement Management. 
• Asset Management. 
• Human Resource Management. 
• Project Management. 
• Strategic Planning. 
NAVSUP and NAVAIR were partnered up for the Supply Chain Management 
pilot SMART.  NAVSUP has 9 major Fleet Industrial Supply Centers (FISC) around the 
world with the primary headquarters in Mechanicsburg, Pennsylvania.  Their primary 
mission statement is (“Our Team”): 
NAVSUP’s primary mission is to provide U.S. Naval forces with quality 
supplies and services. With headquarters in Mechanicsburg, Pa., and 
employing a worldwide workforce of more than 24,000 military and 
civilian personnel, NAVSUP oversees logistics programs in the areas of 
supply operations, conventional ordnance, contracting, resale, fuel, 
transportation, and security assistance.  In addition, NAVSUP is 
responsible for quality of life issues for our Naval forces, including food 
service, postal services, Navy Exchanges, and movement of household 
goods.  
SMART began in August 2000 and encompasses several users and organizations, 
but primarily it was selected to replace financial and maintenance legacy systems 
(Ahern): 
• Uniform Inventory Control Point (UICP) U2.  A legacy system used to provide 
automated means of processing transactions daily within the Navy supply 
system. 
• Naval Aviation Logistics Command Management Information System 
(NALCOMIS) in Norfolk and San Diego for the E-2C aircraft and LM-2500 
engine programs.  Specifically it included organizational, intermediate and depot 
level maintenance. 
 21
• The Naval Inventory Control Point (NAVICP) in Mechanicsburg, PA and 
Philadelphia, PA.  This is the group that manages the two systems in Norfolk 
and San Diego. 
SMART selected SAP for their software provider, and Electronic Data Systems 
Corporation (EDS) was chosen as the primary software integrator.  Considering the risks 
and hoping to maximize the benefits of the program, a four-phase approach to 
implementation was developed (Dyer 3): 
• Phase 0:  A business case analysis was conducted and source selection was 
decided upon. 
• Phase 1:  Employ the ERP integrator to map out the current systems, select the 
software solution, figure out the gaps and recommend the ERP solution. 
• Phase 2:  Along with the integrator and selected software, implement the ERP 
solution for the E-2C and LM-2500. 
• Phase 3:  Forward pilot results to the ESG with a revised business case analysis 
including other commercial pilots and anticipate the expansion of ERP solutions 
to all naval weapons systems and equipment. 
 3.  Naval Sea Systems Command (NAVSEA): Navy Enterprise 
Maintenance Automated Information System 
 NAVSEA is the lead agent for the NEMAIS intermediate and depot level 
maintenance ERP pilot.  NAVSEA encompasses all naval shipyards, shipbuilding sites, 
shore intermediate maintenance activities, Trident refit facilities, all Navy ships and 
submarines (Dyer 2).  Their primary mission, “in partnership with private-sector 
shipbuilding and ship repair contractors, build, maintain, and modernize affordable ships 
that are operationally superior so our Sailors and Marines can protect and defend our 
national interests and, if necessary, fight and win (Sacha).” 
 NEMAIS began in June 2000 with IBM contracted as the lead integrator.  SAP 
was chosen to be the software provider.  For implementation purposes, the project was 
divided into the following phases (Dyer 2): 
• Mid Atlantic Regional Maintenance. 
• Norfolk Naval Shipyard. 
• Legacy data conversion, concurrent with Phase B. 
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• Remaining maintenance regions (7). 
• Supervisor of shipbuilding sites. 
• Mobile Enterprise resource Planning – 300 Navy ships. 
 
C.  THE EXECUTIVE STEERING GROUP AND THE NEED FOR 
INTEGRATION 
An Executive Steering Group (ESG) was organized in December 1998 to oversee 
the pilot programs.  Its charter included holding monthly meetings to ensure any issues 
were resolved or addressed and to provide informational briefings regarding general ERP 
in DOD and the DON (Berg 17).  Pilot Program representatives reported progress at each 
meeting and any issues were addressed as appropriate.  VADM Lockard chaired this 
group.  Other members included System Commands, Fleets, OPNAV N8 and other 
interested parties. 
1.        The Horizontal Integration Team 
 The need for integration across all the pilots was evident from the beginning, so 
the ESG directed that a Horizontal Integration Team (HIT) be organized in June 1999.  
The HIT was composed of an executive committee member and representatives from 
each of the four pilot programs.  This group was to meet as often as required.  The HIT 
was supposed to help focus the ERP efforts across the pilots and take advantage of 
lessons learned as each program developed.  In August 2000, the HIT was removed for 
various reasons including a lack of resources and the lack of authority for leading the 
integration efforts among the pilots (Berg 35).  The individual Program Managers (PM’s) 
requested and were given direct responsibility for taking over the HIT responsibilities by 
getting approval from the ESG for creating the Integration and Coordination Board (ICB) 
in September 2000. 
2.         The Integration and Coordination Board 
The ICB was a direct result of the program managers desires to have full 
responsibility for their programs including integration issues.  In his 2001 summary ERP 
brief, VADM Dyer briefed that the ICB was composed of the four Program managers, 
DFAS and DLA.  Meetings were to be conducted on an as needed basis, and the board 
was to act as “the frontline decision authority on integration and coordination matters,” 
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and decisions that were too complex for agreement or involved Navy-wide strategic 
decisions were briefed to the ESG.  The VADM pointed out the following advantages to 
having an ICB (Dyer 1): 
• The ICB would give improved cross-pilot coordination on scope, configuration, 
and deployment issues. 
• Program Management Authority was part of the board, so directing resources 
towards enterprise-wide solutions would be easier. 
• The ICB meetings would provide a forum for consolidation of issues that could 
provide a rapid response capability. 
The working relationship of the ICB will provide a formal mechanism around the ESG’s 
goal of integration and cross-pilot issue resolution (Dyer 1).  The ICB had a supporting 
staff and sub-teams.  The final ERP integration chain of command, as of September 2001, 
is depicted in Figure 3-3. 
 
Figure 3-3. ERP INTEGRATION CHAIN OF COMMAND  (Navy ERP 
Project Overview) 
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D.        THE GAO REPORTS 
“The Government Accounting Office (GAO) is the investigative arm of Congress 
charged with examining matters relating to the receipt and payment of public funds 
(Government Accountability Office).”  Under this purview the government office tracks 
all of the spending within the nation which includes the Department of Defense (DOD) 
and the Department of the Navy (DON) along with its ERP pilot programs.  Congress 
requests reports and investigations as appropriate and the GAO investigates.   
In April 2005 the GAO published GAO-05-381 titled, “DOD Business Systems 
Modernization, Billions Being Invested Without Oversight.”  It is not specific to the 
Navy ERP pilots, but does mention them briefly enough to warrant discussion in this 
paper because it was not favorable to DOD overall and used the ERP pilots in its 
justification for its conclusions.  In September 2005, the GAO published GAO-05-858 
titled, “DOD Business Systems Modernization, Navy ERP Adherence to Best Business 
Practices Critical to Avoid Past Failures.” 
1.  The GAO High Risk Series   
To understand why the GAO was tracking the Navy ERP pilot programs 
specifically, considering the thousands of other programs they are responsible for, it is 
important to be familiar with the GAO’s High Risk Series. 
GAO's audits and evaluations identify federal programs and operations 
that, in some cases, are high risk due to their greater vulnerabilities to 
fraud, waste, abuse, and mismanagement. Increasingly, GAO also is 
identifying high-risk areas to focus on the need for broad-based 
transformations to address major economy, efficiency, or effectiveness 
challenges (“High Risk…GAO-05-207”). 
Programs that make the list are tracked closely and Congress gets routine or as-
requested reports.  Since 1990, the GAO has been keeping the high risk list, and DOD’s 
business systems modernization program has made the list every year since 1995.   
2. DOD Business Systems Modernization, Billions Being Invested 
Without Adequate Oversight (GAO-05-381)-April 2005    
The GAO conducts investigations to ensure major programs are progressing 
properly, and this report is focused primarily on the DOD business modernization 
program.  It is not very favorable overall, and it does include the Navy ERP pilot 
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programs.  A sampling of the reports findings is presented below so that an appreciation 
for the GAO opinion presented can be realized (“DOD…GAO-05-381” 3):  
DOD has made limited progress in putting in place the management 
structure and controls that will help eliminate its continued spending of 
billions of dollars on systems that do not address corporate solutions to 
long-standing financial and business-related problems. Over the past 
several years, we have made numerous recommendations aimed at 
improving the department’s control and accountability over its business 
systems investments.  DOD has made some efforts to address our 
recommendations, but has yet implemented key corrective actions to fully 
address them. For fiscal year 2005, DOD requested over $13 billion 
dollars to operate, maintain and modernize its existing business systems 
environment.  On its face, this is about $6 billion dollars less than the $19 
billion requested in fiscal year 2004.  But we found the difference reflects 
more a reclassification of systems than a reduction in spending on 
business systems.  Also, the number of business systems reported by DOD 
continued to increase-from 2,274 systems in April 2003 to 4,150 systems 
in February 2005. 
The Navy ERP program is specifically mentioned with regards to the problem of 
reclassifying budget lines.  Reclassifying makes it much harder to track money from year 
to year and over the lifecycle of a system.  The problem of keeping track of Information 
Technology (IT) expenditures is already difficult for the DOD.  This is suggested because 
money is routinely used from various sources for IT expenses throughout the DOD and 
never recorded as an IT expense.  The GAO report found 56 DOD systems that had been 
reclassified and some of them seemingly by accident.  For example, the four ERP pilots 
have always been classified in earlier budgets as business systems.  The 2005 budget 
request for the Navy ERP IT program, new in 2005, was listed as a national security 
system, and Navy ERP program officials agreed it was incorrectly classified and will be 
corrected in 2006.  “DOD officials were not able to provide a valid explanation why the 
program was classified as a national security program (“DOD…GAO-05-381” 4). 
3. DOD Business Systems Modernization, Navy ERP Adherence To Best 
Business Practices Critical To Avoid Past Failures (GAO-05-858)-
September 2005    
This report was not very favorable towards DOD business practices either, but it 
was specifically written regarding the Navy ERP Pilots.  In short, it states that the four 
pilot programs were failures, and that the Navy needs to adhere to best business practices 
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if the new Navy ERP program is going to be successful.  Suggestions and 
recommendations for future success are provided as well as potential problem areas the 
authors discovered during their investigation.  The report is a culmination of the author’s 
efforts from August 2004 to June 2005 and includes comments from the DOD in a 
appendix.  The conclusion of the report begins with, “The lack of management control 
and oversight and a poorly conceived concept resulted in the Navy largely wasting about 
$1 billion on four ERP system projects that had only limited positive impact on the 
Navy’s ability to produce reliable, useful, and timely information to aid in its day-to-day 
operations (“DOD…GAO-05-858” 47).  
a.         Problems Identified in the Report 
Several problem areas are presented in the GAO report.  The authors give 
recognition to the fact that the four pilots were to be limited in scope and not designed to 
become the corporate solution for the Navy’s business issues.  The following problems 
were identified: 
• The pilots lacked coordinated management oversight.  Each command managed 
and funded their project without a central coordinator, which led to each 
program being developed independently.  The result is the Navy having four 
more stovepiped systems. 
• The pilots do not work together.  Each pilot started with the same Commercial 
Off the Shelf (COTS) software, but because they developed independently of 
each other, the pilots won’t work together even though they do some of the same 
functions. 
• There is redundancy of operations and duplication of efforts.  The lack of 
coordination amongst the pilots has led to different solutions for similar 
requirements (“DOD...GAO-05-858” 12). 
• Configuration problems have turned out a system that cannot process 
transactions associated with normal Navy practices in regards to moving ships 
and aircraft between fleets.  User roles and transactions have been assigned 
incorrectly so that some users cannot due their jobs correctly (“DOD...GAO-05-
858” 16). 
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• The pilots have had problems with controlling scope and performance 
schedules.  They have problems identifying the amount of work necessary to 
achieve originally specified capabilities.  Repeated contract cost-growth and 
delays in delivery of some planned capabilities have occurred since the systems 
began operating. 
• The pilots lacked Department of Defense oversight.  The Navy should have 
designated the pilots as major automated information systems acquisition 
programs, but used the term “pilot” to avoid reporting them as such.  When the 
pilots started, any system costing more than $32 million in a year was supposed 
to be a major program which required additional reporting criteria.  Without 
major program oversight, the Navy was able to keep all oversight at the 
organizational level.  The pilots were able to spend without having to undergo 
mandatory integrated reviews which are used to determine where to spend 
limited resources department wide.  
• The Navy has to start over, or rework, its ERP efforts after investing $1 billion.  
“Rework occurs when the original work has defects or is no longer needed 
because of changes on project direction.  Studies have shown that fixing a defect 
during testing is anywhere from 10 to 100 times more expensive than fixing it 
during the design or requirements phase.” 
• The pilots modified the COTS software to fit their requirements.   COTS is 
designed using best business practices and should only be modified under 
extreme circumstances.  The pilots should have modified their business practices 
to match the COTS software rather than vice versa (“DOD…GAO-05-858” 17-
25).  
b.  GAO Opinion of the Current Navy ERP Program 
In Aug 2002, the Assistant Secretary of the Navy established a Navy-wide 
ERP program and directed that the four pilots be converged into a single program.  All 
four pilots are planned to be replaced by 2008.  The GAO report reviewed the current 
Navy ERP program and had the following comments (“DOD…GAO-05-858” 12): 
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• The Navy is following a comprehensive and disciplined management process 
and is using the lessons learned from the pilots. 
• Navy ERP is adhering to the fundamental concept of COTS and understands that 
modifying their business practices to match COTS software is the efficient and 
advantageous way to proceed. 
• Users are getting involved early and getting extensive training.  Leadership is 
emphasizing the need for process change, and the results are that the entire chain 
of command is supportive and knowledgeable.   
• The Program Office is keeping track of the integrators and ensuring they 
implement the methodology and use the common tools supplied by the COTS 
vendor. 
c.         GAO Recommendations  
Three recommendations to the Secretary of Defense (SECDEF) were 
made in the report (“DOD…GAO-05-858” 48): 
• The SECDEF should require the Secretary of the Navy (SECNAV) to require 
the ERP Program Management Office to develop and implement the quantitative 
metrics needed to evaluate project performance and risks and use the 
quantitative metrics to assess progress and compliance with disciplined 
processes. 
• The SECDEF should require the SECNAV to require the ERP Program 
Management Office to establish an independent verification and validation 
(IV&V) function and direct that all IV&V reports be provided to Navy 
management and to the appropriate DOD investment review board, as well as 
project management. 
• The SECDEF should direct the Defense Business Systems Management 
Committee (DBSMC) to institute semiannual reviews of the Navy ERP to 
ensure that the project continues to follow the disciplined processes and meets 
its intended costs, schedule, and performance goals. 
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d. Department of Defense Response to GAO-05-858 
The Deputy Under Secretary of Defense (DUSD) for financial 
management and the DUSD for business transformation responded in September 2005 to 
the GAO recommendations as follows (“DOD…GAO-05-858” 58): 
• They concurred with the recommendation to implement metrics.  “The Navy 
ERP Direct Reporting program Manager is activating quantitative metrics 
related to configuration control, development progress, earned value and 
quality.” 
• They partially concurred with the recommendation to have an IV&V function 
and have reports distributed.  It was agreed an IV&V function should be 
established, but the IV&V reports will be limited to Navy ERP PM and the 
Navy Component Acquisition Executive.   
• They partially concurred with the recommendation for having semi-annual 
reviews.   The reply stated that the DBSMC already gets transformational 
briefings from each of the components that contain overall efforts, initiatives 
and business systems. 
 
E.        THE COST OF THE PILOTS 
The costs for the programs are fairly difficult to trace because the only cost data 
available is the data reported by the ERP Program Managers.  Through 2004, the Navy 
funded the programs via the designated pilot commands without requiring separate 
budget line item justifications.  The 2005 Navy budget request was the first year the Navy 
had an all inclusive ERP request.  The individual Program Managers for each of the pilots 
reported the following total costs of their pilot through September 2004 as follows: 
•   CABRILLO   $67.4 million 
•   SMART         $346.4 million 
•   NEMAIS       $414.6 million 
•   SIGMA         $215.9 million 
Total:  $1,044,300,000 
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The 2005 budget request for the Navy was $3.5 billion for business systems 
operations and upgrades, and it does include ERP.  The Navy estimates the ERP will not 
be fully operational until 2011 at an estimated cost of $800 million (“DOD…GAO-05-
858” 13-40). 
 
F.        LESSONS LEARNED FROM THE PILOTS 
All four of the pilots were designed with different areas of focus.  There was 
overlap in some specific application areas, but not in any major functional area.  All of 
the pilots went live over three years ago:  Cabrillo went live in July 2001, NEMAIS in 
June 2002, SIGMA in October 2002 and SMART in January 2003.  The current Navy 
ERP program, which includes the ongoing pilots, is supposed to use the lessons learned 
from those pilots to date.  Although each pilot reported and continues to provide lessons 
learned, the list provided is comprised of lessons that were common to all four programs: 
• Programs must follow disciplined processes to identify and manage 
requirements. 
• Working level reviews must be cross functional.  Stovepipe systems will not 
work, so every element of ERP must be designed to work with the others. 
• Adopt business processes to conform to the types of business practices on which 
the standard COTS packages are based.  Keep customization to a minimum. 
• Organizational commitment is essential. 
• Planning and task monitoring is critical for all project phases. 
• Make key design decisions early.  
• Communication is vital. 
• Manage integration and move beyond organization boundaries. 
• Carefully plan how the system and process change will be managed after “go 
live”. 
• Lead through the change.  People will want to use the old system.  Encourage 
and train them properly for the new system (“2005 ASUG…”). 
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• Institutionalize business rules and processes.  Update rules, instructions and 
training materials regularly (“2005 ASUG…”) (“DOD…GAO-05-858” 23-
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IV. NAVY ERP INTO THE FUTURE 
A.        INTRODUCTION 
The Navy reported the pilot programs as successful, so the decision was made to 
continue with the ERP efforts and converge the pilots into a single major program 
starting in 2004.  The acquisition process began in 2003 and by late 2004, Milestones A 
and B were achieved.  The program will be very expensive and trying to determine what 
the actual costs will be is impossible at this point in time. 
Navy ERP is only a small part of the much larger DOD RBA and is only a small 
part of the Navy transformation efforts as well.  This chapter begins by introducing the 
DOD and Navy influences affecting the ERP program because having knowledge of them 
should help one understand how the Navy ERP effort is part of a much larger project and 
not just a simple software implementation.  The rest of the chapter discusses the ERP 
program from the success of the pilot programs to the potential costs.  
 
B.        NAVY ERP IS PART OF THE DOD TRANSFORMATION          
To really understand why implementing a COTS software program can be so 
difficult for the Navy, one has to understand where the requirements for the change are 
coming from.  As previously discussed, the DOD is going through a Revolution in 
Business Affairs (RBA), and following the establishment of the BMMP in 2001 by the 
SECDEF, the Navy and all the services have been impacted by it.  The establishment of a 
Business Enterprise Architecture (BEA) with requirements specific to Navy ERP is also 
impacting the program significantly as it develops.  To be considered successful beyond 
the pilots, Navy ERP will have to be compliant with regulations and the DOD enterprise 
architecture.  The following paragraphs present the major initiatives and oversight 
agencies within DOD for the business transformation efforts.  
1.         Business Management Modernization Program (BMMP)  
In September 2001, the SECDEF commissioned the BMMP program as a way to 
transform the DOD.  “He called for dramatic changes in management, technology, and 
business practices.  The Secretary stated that transformation was a matter of utmost 
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urgency because ultimately the security of the nation was at stake (“DOD ETP” V).”  
BMMP is the guiding program which outlines the standards and establishes authority 
and accountability within the DOD and its RBA.  Figure 4-1 shows the BMMP 
Transformation Approach as depicted in the Enterprise Transition Plan for DOD.  The 
Navy pilot ERP programs began prior to the BMMP program, but have since been 
incorporated under the guidelines and leadership of the program.  
 
Figure 4-1. BMMP TRANSFORMATION APPROACH (“DOD ETP” 39) 
 
2.         Business Enterprise Architecture (BEA)  
The BEA is the enterprise architecture the DOD is developing to guide its 
business transformation.  It is considered to be the blueprint or key to the DOD 
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transformation.  There are four requirements that are guiding the development of the 
BEA (“BEA…”): 
• Support joint warfighting capability. 
• Enable rapid access to information for strategic resourcing decisions. 
• Reduce the cost of defense business operations. 
• Improve stewardship to the American people making it easier to trace purchases 
and review investment decisions thoroughly. 
The BEA is further described as an outcome-focused architecture designed to 
answer real world questions.  Five Core Business Missions were designed as the 
framework to support both horizontally and vertically the functional areas of the BEA 
and Business Enterprise Priorities (“BEA…”): 
• Linkage with the Federal Enterprise Architecture. 
• Net-centricity across the DOD. 
• Standardization of data, business rules, processes, terms, and capabilities. 
• Application of government and industry standards. 
• A repeatable, structured methodology. 
Navy ERP is going to be integrated into the DOD BEA sometime in the future.  
The problem, as identified by the CBO report GAO-05-858, is that Navy ERP is being 
developed at the same time as the BEA.  Without having a well-designed BEA with 
restrictions and requirements, can the Navy ERP be considered successful later on if it 
requires rework to comply?  
3.         Enterprise Transition Plan (ETP)  
The Enterprise Transition Plan (ETP) is a document furnished by the DOD 
transition team and is a management tool used by the different services.  It includes 
transformation plans, schedules and budgets as input by the respective services and 
departments.  The report is approved by the SECDEF and the latest update to the ETP 
was in March 2006.  
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4.         Business Enterprise Priorities (BEPs)  
There are six enterprise priorities called BEPs outlined in the ETP.  “They are 
designed to deliver business value to the joint warfighter and a targeted set of business 
capabilities for the DOD” (“DOD ETP” vii):    
• Personnel Visibility:  provide access to reliable, timely and accurate 
information. 
• Acquisition Visibility:  provide access to acquisition information critical to 
lifecycle management. 
• Common Supplier Engagement:  provide a simplified way for DOD personnel to 
interact with commercial and government suppliers. 
• Material Visibility:  improve supply-chain performance. 
• Real property Accountability:  provide near real-time information on DOD 
property and assets. 
• Financial Visibility:  provide immediate access to accurate and reliable financial 
information.     
Each of the services is expected to support the transition plan and the six priorities 
outlined.  By supporting the BEP as outlined within the ETP, along with their own 
transformation efforts including ERP, the services should enable the DOD to transform. 
5.         Defense Business Systems Management Committee (DBSMC)  
The DBSMC was established in February 2005 to ensure executive-level 
involvement and meets monthly.  The senior member is the Deputy Secretary of Defense.  
It is the senior-level committee for business transformation, and it approves all BEA 
updates and ETP releases.   
6.         Business Transformation Agency (BTA)  
The BTA was established by the Deputy Secretary of Defense in October 2005.  
The mission of the agency is, “to transform business operations to achieve improved 
warfighter support while enabling financial accountability across the Department of 
Defense (“Status of DOD…” 71).”  The agency operates under authority of the Under 
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Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology and Logistics (USD(AT&L)).  Day to 
day direction, management and oversight is provided by a cooperative effort between the 
Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for Business Transformation (DUSD(BT)) and the 
Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for Financial Management (DUSD(FM)).  The BTA 
is composed of the following seven divisions (“Status of DOD…” 71-72): 
• Defense Business Systems Acquisition Executive (DBSAE):  The Component 
Acquisition Executive for DOD Enterprise-level systems. 
• Transformation Planning and Performance:  Maintains and updates the BEA and 
corresponding ETP and ensures enterprise and transition milestones are met and 
documented per the ETP.  Has a dedicated team, the Enterprise Integration 
Team (EI), that is specific to ERP efforts for all services. 
• Transformation Priorities and Requirements:  Provides a link between the OSD 
and Principal Staff Assistants. 
• Investment Management: Oversees defense business systems investments across 
DOD. 
• Warfighter Support:  Identifies urgent Enterprise-level business issues directly 
impacting the warfighter and is responsible to resolve issues as rapidly as 
possible. 
• Information and Federation Strategy:  Manages the BTA information strategy to 
include strategic planning, change management and technology visioning. 
• Agency operations:  Provides the administrative support to the BTA. 
7.        Investment Review Boards (IRBs)  
The IRBs review every major business investment and provide review board 
advice and recommendations to the DBSMC.  They are also responsible for certification 
recommendations to appropriate certifying agencies.  As of February 2006, the IRBs had 
approved investment and certification to 226 systems (“Status of DOD…” 6).”   
8.         Enterprise Integration (EI)  
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This team is part of the BTA, but is considered so integral to linking the Navy 
ERP program into the DOD BEA that it is being mentioned separately here.  On February 
3, 2006, the EI Team was given direct responsibility for ERP efforts across the DOD.  
The team is headed by the Defense Enterprise Integration Executive (DEIE)  (Brinkley): 
Specifically, this office will ensure that best practices are leveraged across 
DOD ERP implementation initiatives, will work to ensure rapid adoption 
of DOD-wide information and process standards as defined in the BEA, 
and will work to eliminate any burdensome processes that hinder 
successful, rapid deployment of ERP capabilities within the components. 
 
C.  NAVY ERP IS JUST ONE PART OF THE NAVY TRANSFORMATION   
Transformation is the way of the future for the Navy, and leadership has 
developed new vision statements for the Navy overall.  New business transformation 
goals have been developed since BMMP was established and are stated in the DOD 
Enterprise Transition Plan (ETP). The Navy’s ERP program is a big part of the Navy’s 
business transformation and just as the DOD has oversight committees and goals, so does 
the Navy.  A brief introduction to the major transformational programs, committees and 
goals within the Navy that relate to Navy ERP are as follows: 
1.         Naval Power 21  
It is the Navy keystone vision document and characterizes naval forces with four 
fundamental qualities (“DOD ETP” 84): 
• Decisiveness:  Every element of the Navy-Marine Corps team will be well 
equipped, organized, and trained to bring decisive effects to bear against our 
adversaries. 
• Sustainability:  We are capable of arriving quickly and remaining on-scene for 
extended periods. 
• Responsiveness:  Naval forces operate around the globe, around the clock.  
Operating from the sea, we are free of basing or permission constraints. 
• Agility:  Our flexible organization enables scalability to the requirements of any 
situation. 
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2.         Sea Power 21  
“Defines the Navy with three fundamental operational concepts:  Sea Strike, Sea 
Basing, and Sea Shield, enabled by an information technology component called 
FORCEnet.”  Combined, they give the Navy the ability to project offensive and defensive 
power with operational ease around the world.  It is comprised of five core concepts 
(“DOD ETP” 85): 
• Sea Basing:  Projects the sovereignty of the U.S. 
• FORCEnet:  An architectural construct designed to include standard joint 
protocols, common data packages, seamless interoperability, and strengthened 
security, to enable swift and effective use of information that is foundational to 
Sea Power 21 and Naval power 21. 
• Sea Warrior:  The process of developing twenty-first century Sailors. 
• Sea Trial:  The continual process of concept and technology development. 
• Sea Enterprise:  Promotes incorporation of change to more efficient methods of 
doing business through reengineering and incorporation of new technologies. 
3.         The Navy’s Business Transformation Vision  
The Navy’s business transformation vision is “to significantly increase readiness, 
effectiveness, and availability of warfighting forces by (a) employing business process 
change to create more effective operations at reduced costs, and (b) exploiting process 
improvements, technology enhancements, and an effective human capital strategy to 
ensure continued mission superiority (“DOD ETP” 83).” 
4.        Department of the Navy Transformational Council   
This is the senior organization within the DON and was developed to oversee all 
aspects of the Navy transformation process.  It is chaired by the Under Secretary of the 
Navy and includes the Vice Chief of Naval operations (VCNO), the Assistant 
Commandant of the Marine Corps, Assistant Secretary of the Navy and the Chief 
Information Officer, and other executive leadership as required (“DOD ETP” 95). 
5.         Functional Area Managers (FAMs)  
These are the managers that work directly with DOD counterparts to ensure 
alignment with DOD core business areas such as BMMP and the BEA.  The Navy has 23 
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FAMs responsible for various programs.  The Navy ERP program belongs to the 
Enterprise Services FAM and he works with the DOD EI on ERP issues.  
6.        Navy ERP Program Office   
In 2003, the ERP program office was developed to take the Navy pilot programs 
and integrate them so they could become one large ERP program for use Navy-wide.  
Ronald Rosenthal is the Program Manager (PM) and is responsible for coordinating ERP 
activities within the Navy.  The Navy ERP website is http://www.erp.navy.mil. 
7.         The Navy Convergence Team 
Even before all of the Navy ERP pilots went live, it was recognized by the 
Assistant Secretary of the Navy for Research, Development and Acquisition 
(ASN(RDA)) that the programs would need to be integrated into one program.  In August 
2002, he directed the convergence of the four programs.  In September 2002, the Navy 
Enterprise Resource Planning (ERP) Convergence Team (NECT) was established to get 
things moving in the right direction.  Specifically, the NECT was to:  
• Develop a convergence plan for the Navy. 
• Identify and document common business processes and unique business 
processes. 
• Identify and document those areas where statute or regulation precludes 
common process. 
• Coordinate Navy ERP architecture with other Navy and Departmental 
initiatives. 
• Develop a Navy ERP acquisition strategy. 
• Maximize reuse and integration of existing Navy-related ERP documentation 
and resources (“SECNAV Convergence…” 28). 
 
D.        THE SUCCESS OF THE PILOTS 
The Navy, the DOD and the SECDEF decided the ERP pilots were successful as 
early as 2003, and by mid-2004 the ERP program was moving towards full acquisition 
and implementation.  By September 2005, the Navy ERP program attained Milestones A 
and B.  As mentioned in chapter 3, the CBO report in September 2005 considered the 
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pilots failures.  Because of this disagreement between the two organizations, the 
following summary of pilot program successes is presented.  They were taken directly 
from the Department of the Navy chapter of the September 3, 2005 DOD ETP so that an 
attempt can be made at understanding some of the metrics the DOD and Navy leadership 
were using when the pilots were determined to be successful (“DOD ETP” 91-92). 
1.        SPAWAR Project CABRILLO:  Financial Management  
CABRILLO achieved a fifty percent reduction in the cost of business systems 
support and reduced acquisition requisition-to-order processing time from 44 days to 44 
minutes. 
2.        NAVSEA Project NEMAIS:  Regional Maintenance  
Fleet maintenance activities reduced average total repair times by sixteen percent 
and totally eliminated job rejection notification time.  Prior to NEMAIS, these 
notifications took an average 20 days to process. 
3.         NAVAIR Project SIGMA:  Program Management   
    NAVAIR decreased financial statement processing time by 66 percent and cut 
engineering change proposal approval times by an average 87 days to 25 days.  SIGMA 
also received the 2005 America’s SAP Users Group (ASUG) Impact Award for 
recognizing strategic business results. 
4.        NAVSUP/NAVAIR  Project SMART:  Supply  
Processed over one million parts inventory transactions with an error rate of less 
than one half of one percent and lowered warehouse refusal rate from 3.5 percent to 0.5 
percent.  “Based upon these successful demonstrations of COTS ERP suitability for 
military use in these functional areas, the DON decided to adopt ERP, converge the pilots 
into a single program, and expand the ERP to optimize business processes across the 
Navy enterprise (“DOD ETP” 92).” 
There are more success stories that can be found from the four organizations that 
participated in the pilots, but the point here is that the pilots did what they were designed 
to do and culminated in a go decision for full implementation.  Figure 4-2 summarizes the 




Figure 4-2 HISTORY OF NAVY ERP (Hutsenpillar 9) 
 
E.        THE DECISION FOR ONE ERP  
The pilots proved that COTS could work in the military environment on an 
individual organization level, and in late 2002, even before all four pilots went live, it 
was mandated that the programs integrate.  Integration had been considered the entire 
time with the early establishment of the HIT followed by the ICB, but they were geared 
towards implementation training and lessons learned as each pilot developed 
individually.  The full integration of the four pilots created new challenges as well as a 
requirement for everyone to use the same software. 
1.        The Decision to Converge  
In late 2002, the SECNAV directed the convergence of the four pilot programs.  
The CNO concurred and the mission for Navy ERP was established with the requirement 
to reinvent and standardize the Navy business processes for acquisition, financial and 
logistics operations.  Four key program objectives were developed (Hennessey 6): 
• Build an integrated financial system that complies with Failure Mode and 
Effects Analysis (FMEA) requirements for all Navy commands. 
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• Optimize end-to-end value chains across functional and organizational 
boundaries. 
• Collapse the pilot programs to produce a single product for the Navy. 
• Maximize ROI through effective deployments and sequencing of functionality.  
Figure 4-3 depicts the convergence strategy for the Navy. 
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Figure 4-3 NAVY ERP CONVERGENCE STRATEGY (Fitzpatrick 14) 
 
2.        Convergence Challenges  
The four pilots were developed with SAP software, but they used different 
integrating contractors, and each program individualized their ERP solutions.  How to 
merge four different solutions into one became the obvious question.  The Navy 
identified four significant challenges (Hennessy 13): 
• Each of the four pilots had separate integration contracts and providers, so they 
weren’t using identical architecture. 
• The contractors being used each had different capabilities and knowledge.  How 
do you choose the best? 
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• Each of the pilots had different levels of performance during different periods.  
Which application is best? 
• The pilots are scattered around the country:  San Diego, Norfolk, 
Mechanicsburg and Patuxent River.  Where do we start? 
Considering all of the challenges they faced, Navy leadership decided to start over 
with one COTS software provider and a single Program Manager.    
3.         The Solution 
SAP was already intimately familiar with all four of the pilots, so the Navy chose 
SAP to provide the software to the Navy ERP Program.  The COTS software decided 
upon was the mySAP Business Suite family of business solutions with R/3 functionality, 
which was used to some extent in the pilots, but is significantly more robust than the 
functionality used in the pilots (“SAP Customer Success…”).  SAP will provide the Navy 
guidance and provide subject experts on COTS throughout the convergence process.   
The Navy also realized that one integrating contractor had to be responsible for 
tracking solution development and migrations of system efforts.  Enterprise Integration, 
Inc./IDS Scheer (EI) was chosen with SAP concurrence and GAO approval.  Integration 
as previously mentioned is going to be a significant challenge and figure 4-4 is EI’s 
depiction of the various implementation domain relationships and requirements, Navy 
and OSD, the Navy will have to work through. 
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Figure 4-4 EXTERNAL REQUIREMENTS CONSTRAINING 
IMPLEMENTATION (“The Navy ERP Architecture” 15) 
 
F.       MIGRATION OF SYSTEMS   
Part of the convergence effort is the migration of systems across the Navy and 
DOD. According to the September 2005 GAO report, the first deployment of Navy ERP 
will require interfaces that permit ERP to communicate with 27 Navy-specific systems 
and 17 DOD systems (“DOD Business…GAO-05-858” 35).  Failure to get these 
interfaces will probably lead the GAO to a similar conclusion as already discussed in 
Chapter 3.  Figure 4-5 shows the Navy and DOD systems the GAO expects the Navy 
ERP to achieve. 
 46
 
Figure 4-5 NAVY ERP REQUIRED SYTEMS INTERFACES (“DOD 
Business…GAO-05-858” 35) 
 
G.        ERP ACQUISTION STRATEGY AND COST 
1.         The Acquisition Strategy 
The new program office was stood up in 2003, and Navy ERP became an ACAT 
1 program in September 2004 with Milestones A and B being achieved.  Figure 4-6 
summarizes the Navy ERP migration and milestones summary submitted to Congress in 
the March 2006 ETP.   
 47
 
Figure 4-6 NAVY ERP SYSTEM MIGRATION DIAGRAM (“Status of 
Department…” Appendix G-53) 
 
Note in Figure 4-6 that Milestone A and B were achieved in August 2004 and the 
retirement of the SMART pilot occurred in September 2005.  Milestone C and the 
retirement of NEMAIS are expected in late 2006, and SIGMA and CABRILLO are to be 
retired in 2007. 
2.         Program Costs 
Common knowledge is that ERP systems cost a lot of money and the Navy is 
expected, according to Congressional report GAO-05-858, to spend $800 million dollars 
on the program from 2004-2011.  Further research uncovered varying sources with 
different dollar figures, but they all came in close to $1 billion, and because ERP 
programs typically go over their initial budget inputs, one should expect the program to 
exceed $1 billion.  The most recent cost data available is presented in figure 4-7 and 




Figure 4-7 NAVY ERP PROGRAM MILESTONES AND COST SUMARY (“Status 
of the Department…” Appendix B-12) 
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V. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
A.        SUMMARY  
The Department of Defense (DOD) and the Department of the Navy (DON) have 
been under pressure to streamline their business practices and align with the commercial 
sector for many years.  The Chief Financial Officer’s Act of 1990 directed the services to 
provide annual financial statements using generally accepted accounting terms, and none 
have been able to comply, but many initiatives and oversight programs have been 
instituted to help meet the objective.  The Navy established a steering group in 1997 to 
recommend possible solutions, and their recommendation was the adoption of Enterprise 
Resource Planning (ERP) using Commercial Off the Shelf (COTS) software.  Four pilot 
programs were conducted, three of which are still going, and they were and are still 
considered to be successful by DOD and Navy leadership. However, they were 
considered failures by Congress for several reasons presented in chapter 3, with the two 
main reasons being that the pilots were developed individually and without DOD 
oversight.  These failures caused the Navy to develop a new program in 2004, so the $1 
billion already spent on the pilots was a waste (“DOD Business…GAO-05-858” 12).  
Following the Navy consensus that the pilots were successful, the Navy decided to 
converge the pilots and develop one ERP solution.  This project was conducted as a case 
analysis of the Navy’s ERP efforts from the decision to adopt ERP up to the current Navy 
ERP program.  The objective of this report was to develop a single-source document 
which provides the reader with enough information to have an understanding of the ERP 
efforts within the Navy, understand why the Navy decided to implement ERP, understand 
the oversight which affects ERP implementation, and finally, decide for themselves if 
indeed ERP is good for the Navy. 
B.        CONCLUSION 
The Navy ERP program is going to be an expensive undertaking, and DOD is 
supportive of the effort.  Congress, however, is not convinced that the program will be 
successful, and their 2005 reports detail specifically what it is they do not like about the 
program.  Whether or not the ERP pilot programs were actually successful is dependent 
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on individual interpretation, but nevertheless they ended with a decision to continue 
COTS software implementation and a much larger ERP effort by the Navy.  The ACAT 1 
program was established in 2004 and is expected to run through 2011 at a cost of $800 
million dollars.  Success depends on how well the Navy meets the many challenges of 
COTS implementation and the challenges imposed by federal financial management 
requirements.  Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld is steadfast in his desire to update the 
DOD’s business processes, and it is not likely he will accept failure as an option.     
C. RECOMMENDATIONS   
The Revolution in Business Affairs (RBA) is slowly becoming a reality for the 
Navy.  ERP is going to be a part of it, the pilots proved it could be done, but the 
challenges the new program faces are significantly greater than that of the pilots.  How 
each challenge is handled will be critical to the implementation effort and future funding.   
Success will be measured in a variety of ways, but the minimum standard 
expected will be alignment with the Business Management Modernization Program 
(BMMP) and the DOD Business Enterprise Architecture (BEA).  The obvious keys to 
success are following ERP best business practices, which are common knowledge with 
integrators and COTS suppliers, and using lessons learned from the pilot programs.   
Additionally, the program will have to survive the test of time because it will take a long 
time to get results and cover multiple presidential administration changes. 
Given that common best practices are highly recommended for any COTS 
implementation, the following recommendations are specific to the Navy ERP program 
and are not only provided for program implementation success, but for convincing 
Congress that the program will be successful:  
• As the ERP program develops, constant BMMP alignment must be assured with 
DOD involvement and oversight.  The BMMP has specific guidelines and 
capabilities that are expected for future reporting purposes and changing the 
COTS software will be impossible later.   
• The Enterprise Integration team was established for the purpose of ensuring the 
BEA and the ERP program interface correctly, so the Program Managers for 
both entities must work together as a team.  The BEA is being developed 
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concurrently with the ERP program, yet the ERP program has to interface with it 
when it is completed, and Congress specifically mentioned this as a problem 
they anticipate. 
• Develop metrics with Congressional oversight.  Although understandably not 
easy to do, Congress has to approve the program into the future and currently 
they are not fond of it because there are no metrics available to establish 
success. 
• Integrate the pilots with one COTS provider and have one committee or 
organization in charge of all decisions and disputes.  The pilots also proved that 
separate organizations could start with the same COTS software, and end up 
with different solutions that will not interface.  The ERP Program is currently 
designed this way, and the recommendation is that the Program Manager be the 
problem/integration resolution chairman   
• Congress identified the DOD–Navy systems they expect Navy ERP to interface 
with, figure 4-5, so the ERP Program Manager should consider those as specific 
metrics and correct or address them as implementation allows. 
D.        AREAS FOR FURTHER RESEARCH   
The purpose of this project was to give a broad overview of the Navy ERP efforts 
from the time the idea was conceived to the current program.  The research did raise 
some questions and potential areas for additional research that were not addressed.  
Further questions that could be addressed and researched are: 
• How does the Navy plan to address the ERP challenge of concurrent 
development with the DOD BEA? 
• All of the services are developing ERP programs of their own.  They are not 
using the same COTS software or integrating contractors.  Is BMMP supposed 
to interface with four or more separate solutions, and how do they plan to 
integrate them?  How does this situation relate to the four pilots the Navy 
conducted, and why doesn’t Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld recognize it?  What 
about Congress? 
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• Developing metrics that would be consistent for all implementations seems 
extremely difficult.  What are the metrics? 
• Is there too much Congressional oversight into pilot programs within the DOD? 
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